Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Ralph Reid and Milt Stamoulis v. Oluf H.
Andersen, Ellen M. Andersen; and S. M. Kalm dba
Kalm & Son Real Estate Company, and Sterling G.
Webber : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter H. Anderson; George C. Morris; Attorneys for Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Harris v. Wilstead, No. 7183 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/876

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE

COURT
OF THE

STATE OF·· UTAH
1ll!LPR REID and MILT .STAM~OULIS,
.
. Plaintiffs and 4ppellants,
-vs..DLUF.-H. ANDER~EN, ELLEN M.
j\NDERSEN, his wife; and S. M.
KA.LM, ~.b.a. KALM & SON
~EAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
$TERLING G. ~BBER,
.·Defendant~ a1uJ, ·Respondents.

CASE
NO. 7183

JT., R
JUN 11 1948

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
~-------

-

rn.fn~. -;.-iPR-i~~£-(;O""V;;"T
'
~ALTER H. ANDERSON
GEORGE C. MORRIS
Attorneys for Appellants
.

CI!NTURY PRINTINQ CO •• S.l'.LT LAKE CITY

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I~DEX

Page
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .............•........................................ 3
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPqN..................................

6

AJRGUMENT

7
PROPOSITIONS ARGUED

( 1) That appellants' original petition and more particularly
appellants' amended petition set forth sufficient facts
and grounds for a declaratory judgment................................

7

( 2) That there was a proper joinder of parties defendant............ 14
(3) That although the lower court may not have believed
plaintiffs were entitled to the relief requested, upon the
theory which he may claim relief, that is not justification
for dismissing the action, either with or without prejudice, and refusing thereby to settle the uncertainty and
insecurity giving rise to the proceeding.................................. 11
CASES CITED
Alabama State Milk Control Board, et al. v. Graham, .... Alabama ...., 33 So. 2d 11 ·---···-··-·---·-··-·----------------------------·-··-------- 12
Anderson, et aL v. Wyoming Development Co., et al., ....
Wyoming .... , 154 P. 2d 318 --------·-------------------------------··---·---·--

9

Andrews v. W. K. Company, 35 Cal. App. 2d 41, 94 P. 2d 605....

8

Bruckman v. Bruckman Co., 60 Ohio App. 361, 21 N. E. 2d
4 81 ----·-·---------·------------------------------------------------········--·-------------- 9' 11
Cabell v. City of Cottage Grove, 170 Ore. 256, 130 P. 2d
1013, 144 A. L. R. 286 -------------·--··-----------··----------------···--··------ 9
City of Alturas v. Gloster, 16 Cal. 2d 46, 104 P. 2d 810.............. 8
City of Cherryville v. Wilson, 153 Kan. 505, 112 P. 2d 111,
115 ------------------------·-------------------------------------------------------·---9' 10' 11
Columbia Pictures Corporation v. De Toth, 26 Cal. 2d 753,
161 P. 2d 217, 162 A. L. R. 747----------------··--·-------·---------···----- 13
Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251. ........... ------------------------ 14
Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 215,
277 P. 487 ---------------------------····-·---··---------------·--·····----------···------

8

Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc., 23 Cal. 2d 719,
146 P. 2d 673 and 151 A. L. R. 1062 ...................................... 7, 9
Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis. 676, 242 N. W. 570, 572......................

9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N D E X-(Continued)

Page
Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d 640, 128 P. 2d 526, 141 A. L. R.
14 2 2 ----------------------------------·-----------------------------------------------------8, 14
Newbeck v. McDonald, 128 Misc. 768, 220 N. Y. S. 761, 762........ 9

~I

Oldham v. Moodie, 94 Cal. App. 88, 270 P. 688 ............................ 8, 9
Pacific States Corp. v. Pan-American Bank, 213 Cal. 58 1P
2d 4, 9 81 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

w

Rockland Power & Light Co. v. City of New York, 289 N. Y.
45, 43 N. E. 2d 803 ---------------------------------------------------------------·-- 12
State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17, 264
N. W. 6 2 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Hamera, 292 N. Y. S.
811, 16 2 Misc. 16 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17
Witmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 405, 154 P. 2d 7 48 ................ 14
Wollenburg v. Tonningsen, 48 P. 2d 738, 8 Cal. App. 2d 722 ...... 17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court of the State or Utah
RALPH REID and MILT STAThfOULIS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.OLUF H. ANDERSEN, ELLEN M.
ANDERSEN, his wife; and S. M.
KALM, d.b.a. KALM & SON
REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and
STERLING G. WEBBER,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 7183

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants who were the plaintiffs in the lower
court filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking
to have the legal rights, duties, liabilities and responsi.hili ties of the parties made definite and certain as these
respective relations were affeeted by transactions pertaining to the purported sale of certain real estate. (Tr.
1-5.)
The records of Salt Lake County Recorder's Office
show that the defendant Oluf H. Andersen acquired the
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property in question in his own name. This defendant
and his wife, 1irs. Ellen 1L Andersen executed a written
agency agreement by which they listed the property for
sale with the defendant, S. M. Kalm d.b.a. Kalm & Son
Real Estate Company, for the sum of $10,000. Plaintiffs attempted to purchase this property through said
real estate agent for $9,000, but the owners still wanted
$10,000. The defendants S. :Jf. Kalm and his employee,
Sterling G. Webber, obtained and received a $500 down
payment from t!le plaintiffs· and signed the Ernest
Money Receipt and Agreement as ''agents.'' Defendant
Oluf H. Andersen signed the Ernest Money Receipt
stating, "I will accept $10,000 cash." Plaintiffs accepted
by an "O.K." and plaintiff Reid's signature.
At the time Mr. Andersen signed the Ernest Money
Receipt, his wife, Mrs. Ellen ~L Andersen verbally
agreed to all the terms and conditions of the sale and
told her husband, in the presence of all of the defendants,
that she approved of the terms and that the entire
transaction was agreeable to her. She did not sign the
Ernest Money RecPipt, however, for the sole reason
that her signature was not requested at that time by any
of the defendants.
The Abstract of Title had been approved, and the
parties all contemplated the execution of a proper conveyance of title upon payment of the balance of $9,500
by the plaintiffs. The defendants Kalm and vVebber
notified plaintiffs that the deal was closed, where upon
plaintiffs tendered the balance of $9,500. The defendants
Mr. and Mrs. Andersen, according to plaintiffs' inforSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mation and belief, had meanwhile received a better offer
for the property and consequently refused to accept the
balance tendered, and each refused to execute any conYeyanee whatsoever upon the excuse that they were not
required to do so because Mrs. Andersen had not personally signed the Ernest Money Receipt and Agreement.
Plaintiffs asked for declaratory relief and declaration of rights, asking the court to judicially determine
whether or not plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance by each or either of the defendants Andersen
under any theory arising out of the facts and mor.e particularly under the theory of agency, estoppel, part performance or abatement of purchase price to protect purchaser against possible assertion of Mrs. Andersen's
incJJho}fate right of dower.
Petitioners further asked the court to settle the
uncertainty of their rights against the defendant real
estate agent as pertaining to his actual agency, possible
liability and damages for exceeding the scope of his
authority and the ultimate disposition of the $500 paid
by plaintiffs and still held by said defendant real estate
agent.
Defendants Oluf H. Andersen and Ellen M. Anderhis wife, each separately demurred, both generally
and specially, to the petition and amended petition, (Tr.
12-15, 44-46, 50-52} upon the grounds of uncertainty as
to whether or not the plaintiffs were suing upon an oral
or written contract, improperly uniting causes of action,
~en,
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misjoinder of parties defendant, and not stating sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The lower

,~

court sustained the demurrers and dismissed with prejudice as to defendant Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 20). This
first dismissal was set aside (Tr. 32) and plaintiffs given
an opportunity to amend. Demurrers were again interposed and again the action dismissed with prejudice as
to defendant Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 56-57). Plaintiffs
declined to further amend, and the entire action "·as
dismissed as to each and all defendants. This appeal is
brought on the judgment roll from the lower court.
The undisputed facts, all of which are admitted to
be true, for the purpose of considering the demurrers
and also for the purpose of this appeal, are set forth in
quite some detail in the petition (Tr. 1-5) and the '
amended petition (Tr. 32-38). Authorities for this fundamental rule of law are submitted in the argument.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. It was error for the lower court to dismiss in
each instance, the action with prejudice as against
defendant Mrs. Ellen M. Andersen (Tr. 56, 20).

2. It was error to sustain one defendant's general
demurrer as to another defendant (Tr. 50-52, para. 6 and
Tr. 55).
3. The court errored in sustaining Defendants' motions to strike as to paragreph 3 of said motions (Tr. 55,
42, 48).
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4. The court errored in sustaining each of the demurrers and in each particular thereof.
5. The court errored in each instance in dismissing
the action for declaratory relief and thereby refusing
to takP jurisdiction of the case under plaintiffs' pleadings.

ARGUMENTS
It is rather apparent from the judgment roll that
the lower court had a gross misunderstanding of the
general intent and purpose of our declaratory judgment
statute. There is an obvious failure to distinguish between the fundamental rules for stating a cause of action
for declaratory relief and the ordinary cause of action
in suits of law and equity. Plaintiffs contend that their
petition and amended petition for declaratory relief each
set forth sufficient facts arising out of a justiciable controversy to justify declaration of his rights and to have
made certain, as between the parties, those uncertain
legal relations which arose out of the contract.

The basic law supporting appellants position is well
stated in:
Maguire v. Hibernia Savings and Loan Soc., 23 Cal.
2d 719, 146 P. 2d 673 and 151 A.L.R. 1062:
''A complaint for declaratory relief is legally
sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal
rights and duties of the respective parties under
a written instrument and requests that these
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rights and duties be adjudged by the court. Code
Civ. Proc., sec. 1060; Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d
640, 128 P. 2d 526, 141 A.L.R. 1422; City of Alturas v. Gloster, 16 Cal. 2d 46, 104 P. 2d 810;
Pacific States Corp. v. Pan-American Bank, 213
Cal. 58, 1 P. 2d 4, 981; Henderson v. OrovilleWyandotte Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 215, 277 P. 487;
~\ndre,vs Y. \V. K. Company, 35 Cal. App. 2d 41.
9·4 P. 2d 605; Oldham Y. 1vloodie, 94 Cal. App 88,
:no P. 688. Both the first and second counts of the
complaint herein allege that the existence in
plaintiffs or their predecessor of the rights
asserted by them is denied by defendants and
that defendants intend to convert the reservr
fund into capital stock and distribute the same
in disregard of plaintiffs' claimed rights; both
counts set forth the written instruments upon
which plaintiffs base their controverted claims
and pray for a judicial construction thereof. The
complaint, therefore, shows that there is an
actual controversy relating to the legal rights
and duties of the respective parties.''
The case at bar has certainly shown that there is an
actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties
pertaining to the respective parties and had appellants
little more than prayed for judicial construction of the
Ernest Money Receipt and Agreement, it appears a sufficient cause of action for declaratory judgment would
have been stated. The above cited case and the numerous
cases cited therein support appellants' contention. The
court in the last cited case at page 678 states the rule
in the following language:
''The rule is stated in Anderson, Declaratory
Judgments, page 275, as follows: 'A declaratory
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complaint will not be dismissed because the court
disagrees with the construction of the contract
involved. contended for by plaintiff. A complaint
in an action for declaratory relief which recites
in detail the dispute between the parties and
prays for a declaration of rights and other legal
relations of the parties, states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against a motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of the complaint.' ''
Appellants maintain that, imperfect as the petition
and amended petition may be from the standard of a
model complaint, nevertheless the lower court errored in
sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the complaint
and thereby failing to recognize the intent and purpose
of the declaratory judgment statute.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in the following case,
adopts the general rule in the following language:
Anderson et al. v. Wyoming Development Co. et al.
(154 P. 2d 318 at page 334):
''. . . generally speaking, an action for declaratory relief should not be disposed of on demurrer: N eubeck v. McDonald, 128 Misc. 768,
220 N.Y.S. 761, 762; Miller v. Currie, 208 Wis.
676, 242 N. W. 570, 572; Oldham v. Moodie, 94
Cal. App. 88, 270 P. 688; City of Cherryvale v.
Wilson, 153 Kan. 505, 112 P. 2d 111, 115, and
Bruckman v. Bruckman Co., 60 Ohio App. 361,
21 N. E. 2d 481. See also Cabell v. City of Cottage
Grove, 170 Or. 256, 130 P. 2d 1013, 144 A.L.R.
286; Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. 23
Cal. 2d 719, 146 P. 2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062, and
authorities cited. The position of these courts
may very well be illustrated by what the Supreme
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Court of Kansas has said in the case of City of
Cherryvale v. Wilson, supra (153 Kan. 505, 112
P. 2d 111, at 115), as follows:
''Assuming there is an actual controversy between the parties, the petition should state the
facts out of which the controversy arose, should
state clearly the view or claim of plaintiff and
also state clearly the view or claim of the defendant, and the court should be asked to adjudicate the controversy. The appropriate pleading
for defendant to file is an admission that the
controversy arose from the facts stated by plaintiff, and that plaintiff's contention is correctly
stated; also, that defendant's contention is correctly stated, if, of course, defendant agrees that
the matters are so pleaded. If defendant thinks
the facts giving rise to the controversy are not
accurate or fully stated, or -that the contention of
the plaintiff, or that the contention of the defendant, is not accurately or fully stated, his
answer should plead the facts and the contention
as he understands them to be. If defendant pleads
the facts and the contention is contrary to that
pleaded by plaintiff, plaintiff by reply should
either admit those, or deny them.''
The Wisconsin Supreme Court summarized the rule
in the following case with the following language:
State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 17,
264 N.W. 627, quoting from page 629:
''The reqllisite precedent facts or conditions
which the courts generally hold must exist in
order that declaratory relief may be obtained
may be summarized as follows: (1) there must
exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

rontroversy in which a elaim of right is at-~~Prted
again~t one \Yho ha~ an intPrP~t in contesting it;
(:2) the rontroversy Inust be between persons
\Yho~e interests are advt>rse; (3) thP party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy. that is to say, a legally protertible interPst: and (4) the issue involved in
the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Deelaratory Judgments, Borchard, pp.
26-57. ,,

ENTITLED TO DECLARATION IF NOT RELIEF
The distinction the appellant has tried to make and
which the lower court has failed to recognize is well
stated in the follmYing case:
Bruckman v. Bruckman Co. 60 Ohio App. 361, 21
2d 481:

~.E.

"\\There the petition for a declaratory judgment alleged facts sufficient to state cause of action, demurrer should not have been sustained
even though plaintiff was entitled to no relief,
since effect of that action was to hold that he
had not alleged sufficient facts to constitute
cause of action.''
"Where petition in proceeding for declaratory judgment alleged facts sufficient to state a
cause of action, a court must state the rights, if
any, to which the plaintiff is entitled.'' Also see
Anderson on Declaratory Judgment, Section 101,
page 271.
Anderson on Declaratory Judgment, Section 101,
Pocket Part and also cited in the foot note, City of
Cherryvale v. Wilson 112 P. 2d 111, 153 Kan. 505, recognizes the law in this language:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"It ought to be noted that a demurrer is
rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment
action.''
The lower court errored in dismissing the action
with prejudice as against the defendant Ellen :\I. Andersen because even though the court may have believed
plaintiffs had no legal rights against said defendant by
reason of the statute of frauds or otherwise, the plaintiffs had set forth sufficient facts to justify a judicial
determination and a declaration of rights arising out of
this uncertainty. Although the lower court may have
disagreed with the plaintiffs' claim for relief on the
theory of agency, part performance or etsoppel from
asserting statute of fraud, the plaintiffs were still entitled to declaration of their rights.
Rockland Power & Light Co. v. City of NPw York,
289 N.Y. 45, 43 N.E. 2d 803, the court held:
''A complaint praying for judgment declaring
the rights and legal relations of parties should
not be dismissed as insufficient merely because
the facts alleged show that plaintiff is not entitled
to a declaration of rights as plaintiff claims them
to be, but court should, in proper case, retain
jurisdiction of action and exercise its power to
declare rights and legal relations of parties whatever they may be.'' (Quoting from Syllabus,
paragraph 5.)
Also in the following case, the court stated:
Alabama State Milk Control Board et. al. v. Graham,
33 So. 2d 11:
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''The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in
declaratory judgment proceeding is, not whether
complaint shows that plaintiff will succeed in
getting a declaration of rights in accordance with
his theory, but whether he is entitled to a decla- .
ration of rights at all.'' (Quoting from Syllabus,
paragraph 7.)
"Plaintiff, who states the substance of a bona
fide justiciable controversy which should be
settled. states a cause of action for declaratory
judgment." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph
8).
The following case arising out of an oral contract
for employment closely parallels the issues in the case
at bar and has been extensively annotated in A.L.R.
The California Court states the law in the following
language:
Columbia Pictures Corporation v. De Toth, 26 Cal.
2d 753, 161 P. 2d 217; 162 A.L.R. 747:
''To entitle a plaintiff to seek declaratory relief, it is not essential that he should establish his
right to a favorable declaration.'' (Quoting Syllabus, paragraph 8.)
''The purpose of declaratory judgment is to
serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation.''
(Quoting Syllabus, paragraph 9.)
''The court is empowered to determine disputed questions of fact, and hence remedy by
declaratory relief is not limited to cases involving a written instrument, and disputed oral contract may properly be the subject of a declaraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tory judgment." (Quoting Syllabus, paragraph
10.)
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the law in the
following case and with the following language:
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 405, 154 P.
2d 748:
"A declaratory judgment is proper remedy
whenever it will serve useful purpose in settling
uncertainty and insecurity giving rise to proceeding therefor.'' (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 9, which also cites the case of Gray Y.
Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251.

DEfviURRER ADMITS THE ALLEGATIONS
Although it is fundamentally accepted as a basic
proposition of law that demurrers, for the purpose of
argument, admit the truthfulness of the allegations in
the complaint, the lower court seemed to ignore this
principle.
Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal. 2d 640, 128 P. 2d 526; 141 ALR
1422:
"On appeal from judgment sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave to amend,
allegations of complaint must be regarded as
true." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 1.)
''A demurrer admits allegations of complaint." (Quoting from Syllabus, paragraph 3.)

JOINDER OF PARTIES
The defendants, Andersen and Andersen repeatedly
contended there was a misjoinder of parties defendant,
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yet they admit allegations of the petition and amended
petition for derlaratory relief.
The plaintiffs have only complied with the declaratory judgment statute by joining the parties "who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration" (quoted from the statute), and although
the court may declare that plaintiffs are entitled to no
relief in the form of specific performance or damages
a:' aga]nst the defendant Ellen Thi. Andersen, still she
is a necessary party for a complete adjudication of the
controversy.
The uniform declaratory judgment act is set forth
in our statute as: Utah Code Annotated 1943, Sections
104-64-1 to 104-64-13.
The section dealing with parties reads as follows:
104-64-11. Parties.
"When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding .... "
The intent of the legislature as pertains to the interpretation of this act can hardly be made any plainer
than is set forth as follows:
Chapter to Be Liberally Construed.
"This chapter is declared to be remedial; its
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,

104-64-12.
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status and other legal relations; and Is to be
liberally construed and administered.''
If the defendants Kalm and Webber had been
omitted from this action and if the lower court entered
its declaratory judgment, finding that said defendant
real estate agents had exceeded their authority and were
liable in damages, or were at least liable for refund of
the $500 down-payment, it becomes obvious why they
are necessary parties in order to have a complete adjudication of plaintiffs' rights.
Anderson on Declaratory Judgments, Section 37,
page 115, states the generally acceptPd rule as follows:
''A plaintiff, seeking a determination of any
cause by means of a judgment declaring rights,
liabilities, and jural relations, must comply with
the provisions of the declaratory judgment statute by naming all of the persons as parties who
have a right to defend the action, or who are
interested therein, or who will be affected by the
making of a declaration of rights.
The traditional ruling that is customarily encountered and applied in coercive actions is hardly applicable
to the elastic remedy offered by the uniform declaratory
judgment statute and indeed the rule applicable to this
class of action is far different to the ruling obtained in
the ordinary actions of law and suits of equity and,
"While no complaint can be made against
failure to join a party no longer interested, yet,
if a defendant had a 0ontingent interest in the
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action or proceeding, that is sufficient to warrant
joining hin1.''
The above quote is from Anderson on Declaratory
Judgments, Section 36, page 113, and citing in the foot
notes thereof the rases of "\V ollenberg v. Tonningsen,
48 P. 2d 738, 8 Cal. App. 2d 722; Utica Mutual Insurance
Company

Y.

Hamera 292 N.Y.S. 811, 162 Misc. 169.

Regarding the defendant Oluf H. Andersen's general demurrer (Tr. 50-5:2, paragraph 6) in which he states
amended petition does not set forth sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action against the defendant Ellen
~I. Andersen, the following seems to be the accepted law:
49 C. J. 366, Section 461:
"Where several defendants are joined and no
cause of action is alleged against one of them,
he may demur separately, but a joint demurrer
can not be sustained. One defendant can not,
except on demurrer on the ground that the complaint or petition shows no cause of action against
another defendant.''
The lower court in its zeal to dismiss plaintiffs
action for declaratory relief even ignored the legal principle set forth in the last sentence of the above quotation.
(Tr. 55, 50-52 paragraph 6).
It is respectfully submitted that the judgments of
dismissal of the lower court should be reversed and the
cause remanded for trial and the lower court be further
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directed to make and enter its declaratory judgment
accordingly.

WALTER H. ANDERSOX
GEORGE C. MORRIS
Attorneys for Appellants,
908 Kearns Building
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